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The disciplined study of legal ethics has been an undertak-
ing traditionally consigned to bar association committees and
law day lectures.1 Over the past decade, however, the subject has
become the focal point of extensive controversy and intellectual
exploration.2 As a result, a number of important developments
have evolved through both case laws and legal literature. 4
Most of this year's developments in the area of legal ethics
are a direct response to the recent proposal by the American Bar
Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Stan-
dards (Kutak Commission),5 to revise the Model Code of Profes-
* Associate Professor, Law School of.the State University of New York, Buffalo;
B., 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1973, University of Pennsylvania Law
School
I See generally ABA CoMi. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, DLscus-
SION DRAFT OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, PREFACE, (Jan. 1980) [here-
inafter cited as ABA MODEL RULES DISCUSSION DRAFT].
2 For example, the INDEX To LEGAL PERIODICALS, from 1930-39, listed 171 articles
dealing with the subject of legal ethics, 53 appearing in law reviews and 118 appearing in
bar association journals. From 1960-69 the INDEX listed 397 published articles. Of these,
158 were published in law reviews and 139 were published in bar association journals. In
the decade following 1970 the number of articles published and listed in the INDx in-
creased to 726, 442 appearing in law reviews and 284 appearing in bar association jour-
nals. See also ABA MODEL RULES DIscussioN DRAFT, supra note 1, PREFAC.
I See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (attorney - client privi-
lege); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (solicitation of clients); Bate3
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (lawyer advertising); Goldfarb v. Viriginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedules); Viriginia State Bar V. Surety Title
Ins. Agency, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978) (unauthorized practice of law).
' See generally M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JuSTIcE (1980); G. HAzARD, Elmes I Nra
PRACTICE OF LAW (1978).
5 See ABA Cobm. ON EALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, PROP0Sx FINAL
DRAFT OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT (May 1981) [hereinafter cited as
ABA MODEL RULES]. This special commission was appointed by the ABA in late 1977 to
undertake a "comprehensive rethinking of the ethical premises and problems of the pro-
fession of law" and to accordingly draft a document to replace the ABA MODEL CODE: OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979, with amendments to Feb. 1980) [hereinafter cited a3
ABA CODE]. The commission bears the name of its chairman, Robert J. Kutak.
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sional Responsibility (Code).8 The Kutak Commission's pub-
lished recommendations (ABA Model Rules or Kutak Draft)
prompted a host of critical investigations7 and led to the formu-
lation of two alternative ethical codes, one promulgated by the
American College of Trial Lawyers" and the other by the Na-
tional Organization of Bar Counsel." The net result of these vari-
ous studies has been to focus attention on the fundamental val-
ues underlying our system of legal ethics.
A second area of recent interest and activity focuses on the
moral responsibility the legal profession assigns to the individual
attorney. 10 This inquiry, which questions the validity of separat-
ing one's personal from professional life, strikes at the very heart
of the traditional understanding of professional ethics. It man-
dates a reevaluation of the specific norms elucidated in the cur-
rent code"' and forces us to re-examine the social function of the
attorney as well as the meaning and content of attorney-client
relationships.
The gravamen of this inquiry into moral responsibility is
the extent to which the attorney must identify himself with the
attitudes and purposes of his client. Some argue that the attor-
8 ABA CODE, supra note 5.
See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK CoMMIrrr Discus-
SION DRAFT OF MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Aug. 1980); NEw YORK STATE
BAR ASsOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW ABA DRAFT OF MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Aug. 1980); Patterson, An Analysis of the Proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 31 MERCER L. REV. 645 (1980).
8 ROSCOE POuND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT
OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (June 1980). This draft is commonly
known as the Freedman draft, named after its reporter, Monroe H. Freedman, Professor,
Hofstra University School of Law.
9 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
STUDY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Tent. Draft, 1980).
For a critique of the conceptual structure of the existing code, see Sutton, How Vul-
nerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 497, 510-16 (1979);
Note, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. REV.
671 (1979).
10 Several moral philosophers have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Fried, The Lawyer
as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060
(1976); Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63
(1980); Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIOSITS 1
(1975). For an attorney's valuable intervention in this controversy, see Simon, The Ideol-
ogy of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 30.
" See M. FRANKEL, supra note 4 at 36, criticized in Nessen, Rethinking the Law-
yer's Duties to Disclose Information: A Critique of Some of Judge Frankel's Proposals,
24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 677 (1979).
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ney must maintain a role distance between himself and his cli-
ent.12 Others, rejecting role theory, feel that the attorney should
bear both the cross of his client's sins and the halo of his vir-
tues.13 Reasons advanced in support of this latter view range
from a belief that it is psychologically necessary, to a belief that
the attorney's professional role, as it is currently understood, is
morally ambiguous. 4
Ironically, the demand that the attorney serve as a moral
guarantor of his client is often dovetailed with the vievi that the
attorney must serve as his client's agent. Consequently, a lawyer
is required to follow his client's dictates until the moral yoke
proves too heavy, at which point he can expeditiously with-
draw. 5 This combination suggests that the attorney's duty of
loyalty to his client is of a limited nature.
Similar concerns with the meaning of attorney loyalty are
raised by a problem in legal ethics that has repeatedly vexed the
Second Circuit over the past several years is that of the disquali-
fication of an attorney because of a conflict of interest between
his past and/or present clients.18 Rather than analyze the non-
12 For a good discussion of the concept of role theory, see Sarbin, Role Theory, in
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 223-58 (G. Lindzey ed. 1954). For a discus-sion of the
development of role theory, see E. GOFFMuN, ENCOUNhrEs 85-91 (1961). For an insightful
criticism of the social role theory, see DAHRENDORF, Homo Sociologicus: On the History,
Significance and Limits of the Category of Social Role, in Esvs IN TrE THEORY o
Soc=rY 19 (1968). For a discussion of role theory as applied to lawyer sea Elkins, The
Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64 VA. L. Rv. 735 (1978). See also
Postema, supra note 10, at 65-67 for a discussion of the analogous concept of moral
distance.
" There was much concern that this view could easily lead to the imputation of a
client's moral character to his attorney. In an effort to avoid this problem, provisions
were added to the Code forbidding attorneys from commenting on the guilt or innocence
of their clients. See DR 7-106 (c) (4) and EC 7-24. See also ABA CANoNs OF PROras-
SIONAL ETmcs No. 15. To do otherwise, it was feared, would place the attorney's personal
character into the scales "in proportion to his rank and reputation." Rex v. Paine, 22
How. St. Tr. 358, 412 (1792).
The collapse of this insulation afforded by role differentiation can affect clients as
well as attorneys. For a good discussion of this problem see D. M1LmXoFF, TH CON-
SCIENCE OF A LwYER 220-69 (1973).
1" See Fried, supra note 10; Postema, supra note 10; Simon, supra note 10; Wasser-
strom, supra note 10.
15 This coupling of client control with the flexibility of attorney withdrawal is a view
associated with Professor Freedman. See, e.g., M. FRmimN, LAwvns' ETmcs IN AD-
vEARSmY SYSTm 31-32 (1975). For a discussion of the present Code' position on attorney
withdrawal, see Postema, supra note 10, at 84-5.
1" See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated and appeal
19811
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case law developments just mentioned, this Commentary will at-
tempt to isolate the building blocks for a conceptual under-
standing of the conflict of interest problem.1"
Some discussion of the proposed revisions to the Code of
Professional Responsibility is necessary, however, because the
Kutak Commission treats this conflict of interest issue as a cen-
tral problem for analysis.18 Indeed, the Kutak Draft dedicates
six separate rules to this issue. 19 The Commission's approach to
concurrent representation where a conflict of interest exists is
substantially similar to that of the existing Code,20 but its ap-
proach to successive representation differs, in that the Commis-
sion's approach distinguishes private sector attorneys21 from for-
dismissed, 101 S.Ct. 1338 (1981); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en
banc), vacated, 101 S.Ct. 911 (1981); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567
F.2d 225 (2d Cir 1977); NCK Organization Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976);
Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama Ltd., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976); Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc); W.E. Basset Co. v.
H.C. Cook Co., 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962) (per curiam); Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d
515 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
17 For an excellent discussion and analysis of the Second Circuit's views on attorney
disqualification, see Comment, Attorney Disqualification and the Former Government
Employee, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 979 (1981).
"' See ABA MODEL RULES DiSCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 1, PREAMBLE ("Virtually all
difficult ethical problems arise from conflict in a lawyer's responsibilities. .. ."),
19 ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 5, rules 1.7-1.12. Rule 1.7 provides that:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's ability to consider, rec-
ommend or carry out a course of action on behalf of the client will be adversely
affected by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person,
or by the lawyer's own interests.
(b) When a lawyer's own interests or other responsibilities might adversely af-
fect the representation of a client, the lawyer shall not represent the client
unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the other responsibilities or interests
involved will not adversely affect the best interest of the client; and
(2) The client consents after disclosure. When representation of multi-
ple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the disclosure shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved.
Id. rule 1.7.
20 Compare id. with ABA CODE, supra note 5, CANONS 4 & 5.
21 ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 5, rule 1.9 states that:
A lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
if the interest of that person is adverse in any material respect to the interest
of the former client unless the former client consents after disclosure; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of
the former client unless the former client consents after disclosure or the infor-
mation has become generally known.
(Vol. 47:961
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mer government attorneys.22 In addition, the Commission's
proposal upholds the current standard which affirms that the at-
torney's duty of loyalty continues long after the termination of
his relationship with the client, but does so in modified form.23
Most important, the Kutak Draft suggests new limits to the con-
cept of attorney loyalty to client and the protection of client
confidences;24 limits which inevitably affect any conflict of inter-
est analysis.
The renewed philosophical interest in legal ethics has had
an impact on the problem of conflicts of interest. The concern
for moral autonomy leads away from an objective theory of pro-
fessional conduct to which all attorneys must adhere and leads
toward a subjective "Gillette Brothers Rule"2 5 according to
1 Rule 1.11 of the ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 5 provides that-
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent
a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated
personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unles3 the appro-
priate government agency consents after disclosure.
(b) A lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not-
(1) Participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unles
under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to
act in the lawyer's stead in the matter;, or
(2) Negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a
party or as attorney for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating
personally and substantially.
(c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which
that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the mat-
ter unless:
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the mat-
ter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency
to enable the agency to ascertain compliance with the provisions of the rule.
The Code deals with the appearance of conflict problem in Canon 9. ABA CoDr,
supra note 5, CANON 9. Canon 9 discusses the responsibilities of government and former
government attorneys. See id. DR 9-101. Canon 5 deals with concurrent representation
of adverse clients, see id. EC 5-14 to 5-20, and Canon 4 deals with concurrent representa-
tion problems in general. While Canon 4 accepts that "the obligation... to preserve the
confidences and secrets of... the client continues after the termination of... [an
attorney's] employment," see id. EC 4-6, the issue of successive conflict is not addressed.
2 See ABA MODEL RULES, supra note 5, rule 1.9, Comment.
24 See id., rule 1.6, Comment; id., rule 1.7, Comment.
25 The Gillette Brothers Rule of Professional Ethics states that "if you shave with a
razor you have to look in the mirror, and if you can look at yourself in the mirror every
morning without shame, then you have met the ethical standard of society and of the
Bar generally." Gordon, Professional Responsibility in Civil Litigation, in Pnomsso.
REsPONSmILrY OF THE LAWYER 133 (N. Galston ed. 1977).
1981]
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which the preferences of individual attorneys govern. Such a
trend threatens to create a situation in which the murky divide
between right and wrong in the conflicts area will become almost
impossible to ascertain. A "bright line" approach to this issue
would seem more sensible-for attorneys will agree to accept ob-
jective restraints in their own conduct only when they are as-
sured that their adversaries are accepting similar restraints.
This concern of attorneys for moral autonomy also threat-
ens to create a heterogeneous legal profession devoid of that ini-
tial solidarity responsible for the development of common pro-
fessional norms .2  The resultant tension between professional
and personal demands which would inevitably flow from such
heterogeneity could lead to the development of a legal
counterculture based on dissonant social values, 7 thus compli-
cating efforts to create a viable professional ethic.2
In the late nineteenth century, the discord between profes-
sional norm and professional reality led to the creation of the
Canons of Professional Ethics 29 and a variety of other restrictive
rules designed to raise the ethical level of the bar and to exclude
"undesirable" elements from the profession80 Contemporary
recognition of this cleavage has prompted a number of disparate
reform suggestions. Some of these, which have underscored the
structural inability of the solo practitioner or "little lawyer" to
26 See E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CrvIL MORALs (1957). Similar hetero-
geneity results from the mobility afforded by liberal societies which do not limit entry
into a profession by caste or class.
2'7 The counterculture lawyer views legal processes as avowedly political and sees his
professional function as pressing for changes in the social structure. See Bucher, Pathol-
ogy: A Study of Social Movements Within A Profession, 10 Soc. PRoB. 40 (1962);
Bucher & Strauss, Professions in Process, 66 AM. J. Soc. 325 (1961). For a description of
the position of the legal counterculture in America, see M. JAMES, THE PEOPLE'S LAW-
YERs (1973). For a discussion of the structural strains within the solicitor profession in
England, see Padmore, Bucher and Strauss Revisited-The Case of the Solicitor's Pro-
fession, 7 BRrr. J. L. & Soc'Y 1, 2 (1980) (modem professions contain different 'seg-
ments', groups which share values, interests and identitites which are distinctive and
different from other groups within the same professions").
29 It has been noted that "if the radicalism of the radical lawyer is ever challenged
he can protect himself by invoking the canons of professionalism." Z. BANKOWSkIU & G.
MUNGHAM, IMAGES or LAW 106 (1976). This paradox within the legal counterculture has
been insufficiently explored.
29 The ABA Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted in 1908. See H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 23-26 (1953) for a discussion of the development of the canons. See also
Armstrong, A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063 (1978).
30 J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 102-29 (1976).
[Vol. 47: 961
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simultaneously adhere to articulated standards and earn a liv-
ing,31 have recommended that most of the professional norms be
discarded. 2 Others have urged that the ethical norms currently
embodied in the Code be reformulated into a regulatory code of
conduct articulating principles of positive law.3
This tension between the real and the ideal is a major
source of conflict of interest problems. Potential for conflicts ex-
ists as a consequence of the large growth in American law firms,
the concomitant shedding of smaller clients for larger clients,
and as a result of the growth in the number of multi-state,
multi-office, law firms." This potential exists also as a conse-
quence of the "revolving door" between employment in govern-
ment and employment in the private sector.35 Finally, in the
noncorporate context, the potential for conflict exists whenever,
due to high legal costs, joint counsel is sought to handle such
matters as routine divorces 8 and property transactions.3 7 Al-
'" Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of The Canons as a Group
Moral Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 244, 245 (1968).
Id. at 268-69; FREEDmA, supra, note 15, at 116-18 (1975) (stating that there are
forms of solicitation "carried on with impunity by lawyers seeking to represent those of
wealth and privilege" that have been deemed inappropriate for the attorney who Serves
the poor and unsophisticated).
See Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EmoRy L. J.
909, 955-60 (1981); Patterson, A Preliminary Rationalization of the Law of Legal Ethics,
57 N.C. L. lav. 519, 525-28 (1979); Note, The Lawyer's Moral Paradox, 1979 DUKE L. J.
1335, 1337-39. This position has also been urged in England. See Miller, Advocate's
Duty to Justice: Where Does it Belong?, 97 L.Q. Rav. 127, 129-38 (1981).
3, See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 449 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Interstate
law practice and multistate law firms are now commonplace."). As of June, 1931, over
two hundred and ten out-of-state law firms have opened branch offices in Washington,
D.C.. Nelson, Washington Law Firms Report Continued Growth, LE.Tu Ir, June 8,
1981, at 29, col. 1. See also Note, Regulating Multistate Law Firms, 32 STAN. L. Ray.
1211, 1214 (1980).
See Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a Former Agency Official in
Matters Before an Agency, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1, 25-63.
11 See Kemm v. Superior Ct., 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977); Hal-
vorson v. Halvorson, 3 Wash. App. 827, 479 P.2d 161 (1970).
See Blevin v. Mayfield, 189 Cal. App. 2d 649, 11 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1961); Craft
Builders, Inc. v. Ellis D. Taylor, Inc., 254 A.2d 233 (Del. 1969).
Surprisingly, although the practice is frowned upon by the cout, the British legal
profession has traditionally allowed one solicitor to act for both partie3 in a real estate
conveyance transaction. See Smith v. Mansi [1963] 1 W.L.R. 26, 30 (Ch.); Goody v. Bar-
ing [1956] 1 W.L.P. 448 (Ch.). As part of a 1972 agreement to abandon conveyancing
scale charges, the Law Society agreed to a practice rule prohibiting joint representation.
SoucrroRs' PRAcTIcE RuLE 2 (October 6, 1972), cited in CouNcu. OF Tm Lw Soc r, A
GUIDE TO Tm PRoFEssioNAL CoNDucr OF SoLicrrORs 186 (1974) [hereinafter cited as So-
1981]
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though some have claimed that the economic conflict of interest
between lawyer and client is inexorable, 8 the conventional view
is that the attorney can and should hew to the ideal of rendering
disinterested service to the client and placing the client's inter-
ests before his own.as
The traditional rule, based on the view that only an "ambi-
dexter" can serve two masters, 40 was and is clear-a lawyer can-
not represent two opposing parties at the same time. 1 Modern
developments have placed pressure on these traditional atti-
tudes,'2 however, prompting a number of suggestions to modify
this rule. One suggestion is that the traditional rule should be
relaxed in non-profit contexts. 43 A second is that the rule should
be limited in scope to apply only to actual conflicts and not to
mere appearances of conflict.44 A third suggestion is that the
LIcrroRs' PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr]. This rule reversed the Law Society's earlier position
that there was "nothing inherently improper ... in a solicitor working for both pur-
chaser and vendor." 53 L. Soc'y GAz. 374, 374 (1956). Background on this decision to
alter the rule may be found in H. KIRK, PORTArr OF A PROFESSION 151-52 (1976).
D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLmNT. WHO'S IN CHARGE? 111 (1974). Rosenthal ar-
gues that "in all but the largest claims an attorney makes less money by thoroughly
preparing a case and not settling it early." Id. at 105. Cf. EC 5-1 (Personal interests of
the lawyer should not interfere with the loyal fulfillment of his obligations to his client).
ABA CODE, supra note 5, CANON 5.
See Mason's Case, 89 Eng. Rep. 55 (Ch. 1672) (attorney was struck off the roles
because "he had been an ambidexter, vix. after he was retained by one side he was re-
tained on the other side").
41 The wisdom of Matthew 6:24 (King James) is apposite here. "No man can serve
two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the
one, and despise the other." Id. See Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 378, 244 N. E.2d
456, 462, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 945-46 (1968) (the likelihood of misconduct is increased
when a lawyer represents parties on both sides); Jedwabny v. Phila. Trans. Co., 390 Pa.
231, 233, 135 A.2d 252, 254 (1957) (lawyer who originally represented driver and passen-
ger in a negligence action, prohibited from representing both when driver was subse-
quently joined as a defendant).
4'2 In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F.Supp. 1284 (N.D. Il.), rev'd
sub noma. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978), cert
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1979), the district court argued that "with the modern-day
proliferation of large law firms representing multi-billion dollar corporations in all seg.
ments of the economy and the governmental process, it is becoming increasingly difficult
to insist upon absolute fidelity to rules prohibiting attorneys from representing overlap-
ping legal interests." Id. at 1287-88. Contra, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1979) ("there is no
basis for creating separate disqualification rules for large firms even though the burden
of complying with ethical considerations will fall more heavily upon their shoulders").
43 BOSTON BAR ASSOCIATION COMM. ON ETHIcs: OPINION No. 76-2 (1976).
41 See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated,
101 S.Ct. 911 (1981). See also Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9:
[Vol. 47: 961
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rule disqualifying an entire firm for the conflicting interest of
one partner be re-examined in light, of the growing practice of
building "Chinese Walls" around "conflicted" partners to insu-
late and exclude them from contact with a firm matter with
which they have had prior and conflicting association. 5
Efforts have been made in each of these three directions. At
least one court46 and several bar associations' 7 have suggested
special conflict of interest rules for legal aid societies, thereby
allowing these organizations to represent, with a variety of safe-
guards, 48 both husband and wife in divorce litigations. This ap-
proach violates the principle that standards for legal aid attor-
neys should be no different from standards for the rest of the
profession, 9 but it does so in an effort to make legal counsel
more readily available to the indigent. Without relaxation of this
principle, and absent the use of private counsel by legal aid soci-
eties, 50 an indigent person losing the "race to the courthouse"
might be denied any representation.
A Study of the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243
(1980).
4' See Note, The Chinese Wall Defense in Law Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 677 (1980) (applauds viability of "Chinese Wall defense" in large complex law
firms).
46 Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979). In Flores, the Alaska Supreme Court
found a state constitutional right to counsel in divorce proceedings involving child cus-
tody decisions. The court found that if Chinese Walls are created around attorneys "[i]t
is not... an inevitable conclusion that... [the Alaska Legal Services Corporation]
could not under any circumstances, furnish counsel to take both sides of a case." Id. at
896. Because such a wall had not been erected the court forbade dual representation in
Flores, but urged prospective reassessment of the rule against concurrent repressentation.
Id. Contra, Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89 (D.C. 1971) (following traditional view regard-
ing conflicts of interest and legal aid society).
47 See, e.g., ALLEGHENY CouNTY BAR ASSOCIATION: MEIoANDU M OPimoN (1973) (ca-
nons of ethics do not prevent Neighborhood Legal Services Ass'n attorneys from repre-
senting both child and parents in deprived child proceedings); BOSTON BAR ASSCIATION
CoMM ON ETmcs: OPINION No. 76-2 (1976) (attorneys from separate offices of the
Greater Boston Legal Services may represent opposing sides in legal matters).
48 See, e.g., Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893, 896-97 (Alaska 1979) (safeguards should
include regulations concerning record keeping, access to files, physical separation of of-
fices and supervision of attorneys).
49 ABA Coim. ON ETmICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSImAR , INFORMAL ETMcs OFm-
IONS No. 1233 (1972) ("professional standards regarding representation of differing inter-
ests apply to legal aid offices the same as to other lawyers"); Naw YORK STATE B.A
AssOCIATION COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmCS, 0PMOuNs No. 102 (1969) ("Principles ap-
plicable to... a law partnership apply to Legal Aid Societies."). See Borden v. Borden,
277 A.2d 89, 92 (D.C. 1971).
o See, e.g., Flores v. Flores, 598 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1979) discussed in note 46, supra.
1981]
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The rule allowing disqualification of an attorney because of
the mere "appearance of impropriety" also has been subjected to
increased scrutiny. At a practical level, courts have often found
this type of disqualification necessary in order to avoid the
thorny and sometimes embarrassing thicket of consequences
flowing from the finding of an actual conflict."1 Other courts
have used this rule as an "escape valve" through which they may
disqualify counsel who have aroused "public suspicion or oblo-
quy"52 when no actual impropriety has been identified or
proven. In contrast to these, a third group of courts, and com-
mentators alike, have argued that the appearence of impropriety
alone, "is simply too dangerous and vague a standard to serve as
a foundation for guiding professional conduct."' 8 The recent
proposal to revise the Code of Professional Responsibility, con-
forms with this latter view. 4 While one may criticize the vagar-
ies of its use, the appearance of impropriety rule supports the
belief that courts should be concerned with the public's confi-
dence in the integrity of our legal system. This concern should
not be lightly ignored.
Another ethical standard under attack is the rule stating
that one partner in a law firm is responsible for the liabilities of
all other partners.55 This taint theory is perhaps the most diffi-
cult ethical principle to adhere to for large firm attorneys. The
51 See, e.g., Sapienza v. New York News, Inc., 481 F.Supp. 676, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(The mere appearance that counsel is representing conflicting interests is sufficient to
support disqualification).
52 Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1976).
53 See Kramer, supra note 44, at 244. Accord, ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics,
OPINIONS No. 342 (1975) (The rule stating that one should avoid the appearance of im-
propriety is too nebulous to be helpful); Moritz v. Medical Protective Co., 428 F.Supp.
865, 874 (W.D. Wisc. 1977) (The importance of a party's right to retain counsel of its
own choosing outweighs the appearance of impropriety rule and indicates that the rule
should not be indiscriminately applied).
54 See ABA Mon. RuLEs, supra note 5, rule 1.7, Comment.
15 Under this standard an English solicitor is absolutely responsible for seeing that
his partner adheres to proper accounting procedures. SOLICITORS' PROFESSIONAL CON-
DucT, supra note 37, at 26, 144. "The liability ... for unbefitting conduct of a profes-
sional nature, other than for breaches of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules ... depend[s]
upon whether or not the partner was knowingly involved or by reason of his conduct,
neglect or default contributed to the subject matter of the complaint." Id. at 26. For an
American case adhering to this rule, see Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F.Supp. 1362, 1364 (D.
Nev. 1974) (Partnership law and the fact that fees for services are shared, justify holding
one partner in a law firm liable for the conduct of others in the firm).
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rule reflects historical attitudes toward law partnerships 8 and
has been used to disqualify not only all partners in the con-
flicted attorney's firm, but even members of the tainted attor-
ney's family.5
7
Recent efforts by law firms to develop "Chinese Walls" for
quarantining tainted partners reflect the extent to which prac-
ticing attorneys are seeking a relaxation of present constraints.
Extensive efforts toward the development of a quarantine theory
of conflict have been made in the commercial sphere and have
been applauded by government and law firms alike. 8 Some
courts presently appear to favor this theory,"" but the final dis-
position of the issue is uncertain.
The rationale behind the conclusive taint principle is two-
fold. First is the assumption that persons in propinquity will,
more than likely, share confidences."0 Second is the fear that to
allow a tainted partner's firm to handle the case will create an
5 Some of the uncertainty which large American firms have had about using the
favorable tax consequences of the professional corporation stem from this view of the
partnership as an entity whose liabilities are held equally by all parties See Brill, Ways
and Means: To P.C. or not to P.C.?, 3 Am. LAw. 10 (Feb. 1981).
57 In Canada, for example, the rule is that:
Conflicting interests include but are not limited to the financial interest of the
lawyer or an associate of the lawyer and the duties and loyalties of the lawyer
to any other client, including the obligation to communicate information....
Associates of the lawyer within the meaning of the rule include his spouse, son
or daughter, any relative of the lawyer (or of his spouse) who lives under the
same roof, any partner or associate of the lawyer in the practice of law.
CANADIA BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 16 (1974).
For example, twenty-six former senior government officials filed an amicus brief
in the Armstrong en banc rehearing and urged that the Chinese Wall principle be up-
held. Brief of Certain Lawyers as Amici Curiae on Rehearing En Bane, Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 101 S.Ct. 911 (1931). In addi-
tion, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Department of Justice, Federal Mar-
itime Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission all expressed their support for this position. 625 F.2d at 443 n. 18.
" See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated,
101 S.Ct. 911 (1981); Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc., v. United States, 639 F.2d 749 (Ct. CL
1981); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. CL 1977) (per curiam).
"Understanding this natural human tendency, the English Law Society Council
noted in response to a query regarding the propriety of office sharing between in-
dependent firms, "that they did not see how such group practices could overcome the
difficulties caused by clients' privilege." Soucrros' PROFESSIONAL- CoNwurr, supra note
37, at 27. In response to a simla query regarding the sharing of office services, the
Council noted "that difficulties of ensuring preservation of clients' confidences and of
clients' privilege might make a common typing service for other than purely routine mat-
ters impracticable and undersirable." Id.
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appearance of impropriety in the eyes of the layman and
thereby engender decreased public confidence in the legal
profession. 1
An alternative to the present taint theory and rule of total
disqualification is to limit disqualification to those cases where
actual confidences have been transmitted and a possibility exists
that these confidences will be abused.6 2 Under this standard an
attorney might represent a client with interests adverse to those
of a former client so long as the former client's confidences are
not revealed.
This alternative view, of necessity, raises the question of the
extent to which former clients must be adversely affected before
an attorney may be disqualified. In Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,6 s the court held that the defen-
dants, former associates of a law firm having a "peripheral rela-
tionship" to prior litigation, refuted the presumption of taint by
showing that there was no actual injury to the complaining for-
mer client." An early English case, Rakusen v. Ellis, Munday &
Clarke,e5 held similarly, finding that proof of prior retainer,
alone, was not sufficient to support disqualification. 0 Instead,
the court stated, the complaining party must show that "real
mischief and real prejudice will in all human probability result if
the solicitor is allowed to act. ' 67 In Rakusen, the attorney ac-
01 Thus, the English rule which asserts a conclusive taint for solicitors who change
firms states:
Where a solicitor or a member of his staff who has acted on behalf of a client
in respect of any matter, irrespective of its nature, thereafter joins a different
firm where he has the opportunity of acting for a party with adverse interests
from those of his former client, he and the firm which he joins should cease to
act in that matter if he has acquired in his former capacity any information
which would not properly have become available to him in his new capacity.
Although in theory there might be no objection to the solicitor acting in his
new capacity where the client with full knowledge of all the implications gives
consent to his so doing, nevertheless the need to ensure that justice must be
seen to be done must render rare the case in which it would be safe for the
solicitor or the firm which he has joined to continue to act.
SoLICrroRS' PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 37, at 49.
62 See CoRDERY's LAW RELATING TO SOLICrrORS 89 (6th ed. 1968).
03 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), af'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
4 Id. at 588.
6- [1912] 1 Ch. 831 (C.A.).
"Id. at 835.
6 Id. A similar position is taken by other Commonwealth courts. See Farmers Mut.
Protection v. United States Smelting, 28 D.L.R.2d 618 (Sask. 1961); Ranlall Aqarwallah
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cused of taint was out of the country during the period his finm
was litigating the case in question. Thus, the court found that
any transmission of confidences to him was impossible.6 8
Recent "Chinese Wall" approaches to the conflict of interest
issue can be viewed as attempts to resurrect the Rakusen para-
digm-to create situations in which transmission of confidences
is impossible. The success of this approach lies in the eye of the
beholder. Construction of the wall usually begins after a conflict-
ing matter comes to the firm. Thus, unlike Rakusen, the poten-
tial for intentional or unintentional transmission of confidences
does exist. At best, the wall, because it depends in large part on
the good faith of all participants, the absence of unconscious dis-
closures, and pure luck, can prevent only communications subse-
quent to the discovery of the conflict. Furthermore, the wall ap-
pears to represent a denigration of the attorney's ex-post facto
duty of loyalty to his former client. It is unlikely that former
clients will feel confident in the knowledge that their interests
are being protected via walls constructed by their adversaries'
law firms, just as it is unlikely that the public will believe that
attorney-regulated walls are not conveniently porous. The diffi-
culty in implementing "Chinese Walls" can be seen in the deci-
sion in Cheng v. GAF Corp."9 where, despite a law firm's sincere
efforts to quarantine its tainted attorney, the firm was disquali-
fied because of its relatively small size and the consequent in-
creased likelihood of inadvertant disclosures.70
To date, case law discussions of conflicts of interest have
failed to illuminate a central issue underlying the prob-
lem-whether or not client consent is sufficient to vitiate a con-
flict. Courts have focused their attention solely on methods to
ensure that confidential communications will not be leaked to
the detriment of former clients.71 While the protection of client
interests is clearly a central concern, other interests may be rele-
v. Moonia Bibee, 6 Indian L.R. 79 (Calcutta 1880).
[1912] 1 Ch. at 836.
69 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated and appeal dismissed, 101 S.Ct. 1338
(1981).
70 Id. at 1059.
7' See, e.g., Cheng v. GAF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated and appeal
dismissed, 101 S.Ct. 1338 (1981); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en
banc), vacated, 101 S.Ct. 911 (1981); Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc., v. United States, 639




vant. As one comparative analysis of Germany's legal profession
has noted: For an attorney to represent adverse interests would
violate "the trust of the client as well as the principle that the
lawyer, as an officer of the court, should stand by the course of
action chosen. . . .A consequence of this emphasis is that con-
sent of the clients involved does not justify the [attorneys] work-
ing for both sides.
'7 2
The German legal profession's refusal to allow client con-
sent to waive conflict problems illustrates that the issue in con-
flict of interest problems is not merely the protection of client
interests. Courts are also concerned with preventing the integ-
rity of the legal system from being infringed by attorneys who
undercut principles of adversariness in order to serve a multi-
tude of clients s.7  Thus, an early American court maintained that:
[A] client cannot consent that an attorney should be released from
obligations which the law imposes on him. A client may waive a privi-
lege which the relation of attorney and client confers upon him, but
he cannot enter into an agreement whereby he consents that the at-
torney be released from all the duties, burdens, obligations, and privi-
leges pertaining to the relation of attorney and client .... The fact
that a client may be willing to enter into such a contract does not
justify the court in upholding it, nor can the client's consent or conni-
vance shelter an attorney from unprofessional conduct. Courts owe a
duty to themselves, to the public, and to the profession which the te-
merity or improvidence of clients cannot supercede.
7 4
The courts, therefore, and not the clients, control the pro-
fessional conduct of attorneys, and the concerns of each differ.
Thus, even where a client consents to a conflict situation (an
event which rarely occurs in former client contexts unless gov-
ernment agencies are involved),7 5 a court nevertheless may pro-
72 D. RUESCHEMEYER, LAWYERS AND THEIR SocIETY 126 (1973). Indeed, the represen-
tation of conflicting interests is criminal as well as unethical. Id. at 125. See also
Hogrefe, Referat Zur Nergestaltung des Paragraphen, 1954 ST. GB. 356, reprinted in
W. KALSBACH, STANDESRECHT DEs RECHTSANWALTS 350-64 (1956).
For a similar American view, see Chateau De Ville Prods., Inc., v. Tams-Witmark
Music Library, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 223, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (it is doubtful that client
consent will cure a conflict of interest problem).
73 For a historical articulation of this view, see Anonymous, 7 Mod. 47 (1702).
7' In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 957 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1897).
7'A number of government agencies have developed disqualification rules which al-
low an agency to waive its objection to a conflict under certain circumstances. See, e.g,,
17 C.F.R. 200.735-8(8)(1980) (The Securities and Exchange Commission will grant waiv-
ers if the firm has adopted screening measures which isolate disqualified individuals
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hibit an attorney from representing interests adverse to those of
the consenting client in order to vindicate principles of profes-
sional loyalty to clients past and present. As an early draft of
the Kutak Commission Report makes clear, "[a] client's consent
does not legitimate a lawyer's abuse of professional office."78
Courts may vindicate these principles of professional loyalty
despite an attorney's argument that exigent realities make ad-
herence to professional norms difficult." Empirical evidence re-
futes the notion that "the licensed practitioner is someone who
has been reconstituted by his learning experience and is now set
apart from other men.17 8 While the small practitioner complains
that the constraints of professional norms are too costly to fol-
low, 79 the large firm often ignores them or bends their spirit.8e
The changing structure of the profession may well require a re-
vision of the customary rules of etiquette contained in the Code
of Professional Responsibility. 1 It should not require a shift in
from participating in the subject matter or sharing in the fees derived from litigating this
matter). In contrast, one commentator has argued that attorneys under certain circum-
stances have an ethical duty to move to disqualify an adversary and may not waive this
duty. Comment, The Ethics of Moving to Disqualify Opposing Counsel for Conflict of
Interest, 1979 DuKE L. J. 1310, 1317-20, 1331-33.
76 ABA MODEL RULEs DIscUSSION DRAFT, supra note 1, rule 1.8, Comment.
One commentator, noting the practical arguments sometimes advanced in support
of a departure from professional norms observed that "[b]etween the officidal require-
ments of the Canons of Professional Ethics and the practical demands of individual
practitioners there is often sharp conflict." J. CAnN, L iw Rs oN THIR OWN 155
(1962). See also id. at 209. It should be noted that the author does not specifically dis-
cuss conflict of interest issues.
78 E. GOFFmAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SEF IN EVERYDAY LE 46 (1959).
79 Professor Carlin, in studying the acceptance of ethical norms by varying sized
firms, found significant response differences concerning a number of ethical issues, but
none concerning the conflict of interest question. J. CARuN, LAwyzRS' ETmcs 50, Table
30 (1966). He also found that conflict problems develop more often in small practices. Id.
at 58, Table 38. In general, Carlin's study revealed that the smaller the law firm, the
more likely it is to violate ethical norms. Id. at 55. Professor Carlin identifies the reason
for this as being the fact that the lawyer's location in the system of bar stratification
determines both the nature of his clientele and the extent to which he is insulated from
situational inducements to violate ethical norms. Id. at 122, 129. See also Cheng v. GAF
Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1059 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated and appeal dismissed, 101 S.Ct. 1333
(1981) (conceding that effective screening is more difficult in a small law firm).
0 oNote, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intra-
Firm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L. J. 1058, 1070-71, (1964) (research based on an
extensive questionnaire sent by author to a sample of large corporate firms).
8' Law firms have opposed the presumption of taint in a variety of contexts. Thus,
after the California Supreme Court in Camden v. Superior Ct., 576 P. 2d 971, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (Cal. 1978) disqualified Loeb & Loeb, a seventy-five member law firm, from rep-
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those rules of professional conduct designed to assert profes-
sional norms and to protect client interests.
The treatment by American courts of conflict of interest
problems provides an interesting laboratory for exploring inter-
actions between economic and social pressures and professional
legal standards of conduct. Arguments in favor of "screening"
former government officials are predicated largely on the fears
that law firms will decline to hire young civil servants unless
traditional restraints are relaxed.2 But the extent to which
strict adherence to these restraints actually inhibits an attor-
ney's career s$ has neither been proven nor studied.8 4 Similarly,
arguments concerning the inexorable growth of law firms, the ec-
onomic necessity for multi-office firms, and their subsequent ef-
fect on ethical norms, have not been examined. The perspective
of the Second Circuit on disqualifiaction issues does not necessa-
resenting the plaintiffs in a litigation matter because of the possibility that one of the
partners might be called as a witness, the California State Bar Association proposed an
amendment to the state code of ethics exempting law firms from the rule that prohibits
an attorney from being both lawyer and witness in the same case. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Dec.
1978), Rule 2-111 (A)(4). See also Brown & Brown, Disqualification of the Testifying
Advocate-A Firm Rule?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 597, 622 n. 104 (1979); Enker, The Rationale
of the Rule That Forbids a Lawyer To Be Advocate and Witness in the Same Case,
1977 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 455.
2 See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 101
S.Ct. 911 (1981). In Armstrong the Second Circuit rested its decision to allow screening
on the public policy concern that strict application of the conflicts rule would "hamper
the government's efforts to hire qualified attorneys." Id. at 443. See also Kesselbaut v.
United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam).
83 See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., v. Chrysler Motors Corp. 370 F. Supp. 581,
589 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("the rigid rule of total disqualification" will force young attorneys
to "become over-committed to their initial employer"), afl'd 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir.
1975) (It is important to avoid unnecessarily constricting the careers of lawyers who
started their practice at large firms.).
See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 454 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Newman,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling for "concrete evidence of adverse
consequences" before allowing the conflicts rules to be changed), vacated, 101 S.Ct. 911
(1981).
The United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey has for several years
maintained a policy prohibiting a former assistant now in private practice from handling
any case that was pending in the office during the assistant's employment, even if the
assistant had no knowledge, responsibility or connection with the case. In United States
v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980), "[t]he First Assistant U. S. Attorney testified that
the policy had neither hindered the office's ability to recruit assistants nor excessively
restricted the practice of former assistants." Id. at 1203.
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rily reflect the views of the rest of the country."" Without more
intensive inquiry, we should not perceive the "Chinese Wall" as
an easy solution to the ethical problems raised by conflicts of
interest.
The Eighth Circuit takes a far stricter view on the status of appearances. Com-
pare State v. Dean Foods Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1979); Fred Weber, Inc., v.
Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 905 (1978); with Arm-
strong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 446 (2d Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 911
(1981); and Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979). Both the
Third and the Fifth Circuits have evolved per se disqualification rules concerning close
relationships between plaintiff class representatives and class counsel in fee-generating
class actions. See Zyistra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 578 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1978); Kramer v.
Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Susman v. Lincoln Am.
Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 94-95 (7th Cir. 1977).
The Ninth Circuit explicitly chose to "express no opinion upon the 'Chinese Wall'
theory". Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 n. 5 (9th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit has
rejected the wall in theory but it has not articulated a rule per se. Westinghouse Elee. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1321 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 439 US. 955 (1978). Ac-
cord, MPL, Inc., v. Cook, 498 F. Supp. 148, 151 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (where law firm is in
possession of client confidences and secrets derived from an earlier representation, no
wall may be erected).
The Sixth Circuit, to date, has not ruled on the "Chinese Wall" theory. A district
court within the circuit, however, rejected the theory based on the Seventh Circuit's rea-
soning in Westinghouse. Contracting & Material Co., v. Steel Co. of Canada, No. 78-
70403 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 15, 1981).
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